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Abstract: Through the case of EU foreign and security policy we reconsider the concept of great
power. According to common wisdom, the EU cannot be a great power, whatever the pro-
nouncements of its top officials may be. We argue that ‘great power’ has been miscast in
IR theory as a status rather than as a social role, and, consequently, that the EU can indeed
be viewed as playing the great power role. Such a conceptual shift moves analytical at-
tention away from questions of what the EU is – ‘big’, ‘small’, ‘great’, and so on – to what
it is expected to do in international politics. We focus on the expectation that great pow-
ers engage in the management of the international system, assessing the EU as a great
power manager in two senses: first, in the classical sense of ‘great power management’ of
Hedley Bull – which centers on great powers’ creation of regional spheres of influence
and the maintenance of the general balance of power – and second, in light of recent cor-
rections to Bull’s approach by Alexander Astrov and others, who suggest great power man-
agement has changed toward a logic of governmentality, i.e. ‘conducting the conduct’ of
lesser states.
Keywords: great power, great power management, IR theory, social roles, EU foreign policy, interna-
tional order
INTRODUCTION: THE EU AS AGREAT POWER
On 28 June 2016, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Federica Mogherini announced the publication of an ambitious new Global Strategy
– the EUGS (European Union, 2016). The EUGS proclaims that “with half a billion
people, a large economy, and a ‘wide and deep’ diplomatic network,” the world
“need[s] a strong Union like never before.” The EUGS 2016 might be considered a
surprising document, appearing with fanfare and ambition as it did just five days
after one of the EU’s largest members – the United Kingdom – voted to leave the
Union. But an alternative interpretation sees the EUGS as signifying the staying-
power of the EU as a now-prominent actor on the world stage. The EU began the
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1950s as largely an economic community. Today, however, while having sole com-
petence in trade policy for its 27 members (after the UK withdrawal) – with a com-
bined GDP of over $14.5 trillion – the EU also boasts large and growing capabilities
for influencing world politics beyond economics, and a willingness to use them
(Kaunert and Zwolski, 2013; Smith, 2014; Wolff and Whitman, 2012).
In this paper, we use the emergence of the EU as a consequential actor in global
security as a prompt to reconsider a key notion in International Relations (IR) – great
power – and explore the implications of this reconsideration for international poli-
tics and order. We argue that ‘great power’ has been miscast in IR theory as a sta-
tus rather than as a social role. The EU can indeed be viewed as a great power, we
maintain, once great power is understood as a role rather than a status. We show
that when conceptualized as a role, great power has significant potential for im-
proving our understanding of and explaining not only EU foreign policy, but also
that of other great powers or would-be great powers. Such a conceptual shift use-
fully moves analytical attention away from questions of what the EU or any other
actor in world politics is – ‘big,’ ‘small,’ ‘great’ or not, and so on – to questions of
what they are expected to do. Bracketing the ontological question of what the EU
really is and grasping the role-based expectations that constitute it as an actor, we
suggest, takes us further in explaining its curious agency in world politics.
To make good on this claim we assess the EU as a great power manager in two
senses: first, in the classical sense of “great power management” (Bull, 2012 [1977]:
194–222), which centers on great powers’ creation of regional spheres of influence
and the maintenance of the general balance of power; and second, in light of recent
corrections to Bull’s approach by Alexander Astrov (2011a) and others,1 who suggest
great power management (hereafter GPM) has changed toward a logic of govern-
mentality—“conducting the conduct” of lesser states.
We show that leaving assessments of the quality or effectiveness of EU foreign
and security policy aside, the principal expectations acting on and being acted upon
by EU leaders can be best grasped in terms of great power management and the
great power role in these two senses. The primary purpose of such a reconceptual-
ization of great power and its application to the EU is to recapture the concept’s
usefulness for thinking about the contemporary international order. The term great
power is often used loosely, referring at times to states as different as the US and so-
called regional powers like Iran or Saudi Arabia, but not usually to established non-
state actors like NATO and the EU (although see Buzan and Waever, 2003; Astrov,
2011a: 13). But for reasons of both analytical usefulness and faithfulness to real world
differences, it is important to restrict the concept’s application to a more limited
class of international actors.2
In the case of the EU, our reconceptualization of great power as a role allows us
to answer the following core questions: why do non-EU states expect and urge the
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EU, a union which was originally conceived as economic in means and regionally-
focused, to do things that go well beyond economic matters, like crisis prevention
and even, in a Foucauldian sense, ‘conducting the conduct’ of lesser states interna-
tionally? What is the EU’s motivation to expend significant political and economic
capital on managing political matters not only in its neighborhood but also in other
distant places? We could answer the first question by saying that it is because the EU
is increasingly expected to behave as a great power manager, despite its compound
nature and the lack of attributes of a classical GP state – the success of its policies
notwithstanding.3
We proceed with our analysis as follows. We first reprise the standard conceptu-
alization of great power as status, showing how it closes down at least as many an-
alytical avenues as it opens up. We then recast great power as a social role, and
describe classic and more recent views of great power management. The bulk of the
paper then assesses the extent to which the European Union can be understood as
responding to the expectations of the great power role and engaging in GPM. We
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our argument for future studies of
EU foreign policy and ‘great powers’ other than the EU.
GREAT POWER: STATUSOR SOCIAL ROLE?
According to common wisdom, the EU cannot be a great power, whatever the pro-
nouncements of its top officials. The EU is not a state or even a unified actor, and it
possesses no army of its own. The EU can best be understood as a peculiar, even sui
generis, form of international organization, as can the United Nations (UN) or the
African Union (AU). For some thinkers who do not subscribe to the common wis-
dom, if the EU plays a role on the international stage it is as a ‘small’ (Toje, 2011) or
‘middle’ power, not a great one.
However, the EUGS 2016 seems to signal precisely the Union’s commitment to
playing a great power role in international politics. As Mogherini argues, important
actors within Europe – France, Germany, and, until recently, the UK – and beyond
it, expect the EU to engage in behaviours characteristic of great powers (“wherever
I travel, our partners expect the European Union to play a major role,” she notes).
Such behaviours include high-level diplomacy, like participation in the Iran nuclear
negotiations, and maintaining international security, as in the case of anti-piracy mil-
itary operations off Somalia.
As typically theorized in realist-inspired approaches, the term great power refers
to a status attained by the largest states measured in material terms (e.g. Kennedy,
1989: 3–38). Great-power-as-status is most clearly on display in Kenneth Waltz’s
definition, which, although 40 years old, remains influential (e.g. Monteiro, 2011/12:
13). For Waltz (1979: 129–131, 162), only if a state is in the first rank across a range
of sectors – military, economics, population size, and political competence – does
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it count as a great power. Should a state be lacking in one or more of these cate-
gories, it is disqualified from the category.
Critics have taken issue with this material understanding of great power. For con-
structivists, great power is not only a material category but a social one also (see,
e.g., Bukovansky et al., 2012: 25–50). Constructivists point to two aspects of great
power attribution missed by a material status-based approach: the necessity of
recognition of the great power as such by its peers, and the associated notion of a
great power ‘club’ complete with membership rules and responsibilities (for an in-
sightful recent discussion of this, see Loke, 2016). Japan’s defeat of Russia in the war
of 1905 therefore afforded Japan entry to the great power club, whereas previously
it had been considered a peripheral power. Nonetheless, constructivists often share
with their materialist colleagues an understanding of great power as status, a prop-
erty of some states and not others; they simply add recognition to the list of assets
great powers enjoy.
From the perspective of great-power-as-status the EU is not a great power. Neither,
importantly, are contemporary China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, and Japan, nor
the UK, France, and Germany. Some of these are ‘aspiring great powers,’ while the
big European states are ‘former great powers,’ which further proves the inadequacy
of the ‘club’ conception of great power-ness described above, at least for the cur-
rent era. The problem with a status-based understanding of great power is that it
leaves the label applicable to one state and one state only today: the United States
of America. This renders it difficult to analyse the significance of the rise of states like
China until they reach the US level of material power across all of Waltz’s categories.
In the case of China in particular, although it might not measure up to America in all
areas, it can surely no longer be understood as simply a ‘normal power’.
The concept of great power understood as a status would also, we would sug-
gest, be in fact inapplicable to the US, which is anything but a traditional great power.
Indeed, Hedley Bull himself (2002 [1977]: 196) was sceptical about the applicabil-
ity of the term great power to international order in the period in which he was writ-
ing. The then-prominent label ‘super-power’ was, in his opinion, of “doubtful utility.”4
The concept of great power does not seem adequate to the US case, but the notion
of super-power adds little analytically.
Conceptualizing great power as status then seems to close down as many signif-
icant lines of inquiry as it opens up. Rather than jettisoning the concept altogether,
however, we propose explicitly recasting great power as a social role and consider-
ing the theoretical and empirical implications of such a reformulation. While roles
and statuses are related, importantly, they are not the same.
Statuses, as applied to international politics, are “collective beliefs about a given
state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demo-
graphic position, socio-political organization, and diplomatic clout)” (Paul, Larson,
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and Wohlforth, 2014: 7). Status-oriented behaviour is focused on acting in ways ap-
propriate to one’s rank order in a hierarchy, and gaining recognition as having such
a status, for example, by dressing more professionally than one’s employees. Status
is undoubtedly important in world politics, representing a prominent aspect of de-
cision-making of both large – think of Russia’s long-standing desire to be acknowl-
edged as a great power (Neumann, 2008) – and small states (see de Carvalho and
Neumann, 2014). But there is good reason to consider great power as a role, not a
status.
The key difference between roles and statuses is that statuses have fewer and
more bounded behavioural expectations attached to them than roles. Roles are,
by definition, sets of thick expectations about behaviour attached to particular po-
sitions in a social setting (Joas, 1993: 214–237), expectations that, crucially, are not
limited to concerns over status ranking. To continue the work wear example, con-
sidering someone’s social role tells us why some people – say entrepreneurs (or
professors when not teaching!) – might eschew traditional business-wear, choosing
to wear fashionable or comfortable clothing to work instead, regardless of what
such clothing communicates in terms of status. The status of professors or entre-
preneurs is not diminished by wearing comfortable clothing to work in the way the
status of others in business or administration of similar rank might be, and under-
standing why rests on the expectations that make up the professor and entrepre-
neur roles.
Thinking of great power in a role-based manner, as opposed to in status terms,
thus opens up questions related to the broader social context which underpins ap-
propriate behaviour. Again, why might someone signal high status by wearing a re-
served business suit, while others might choose high fashion? The answer hinges
on their role within a particular social milieu. In world politics, the social milieu is in-
ternational society or, in other terms, international order understood in a far more cul-
turally thick way than realists in IR theory have tended to give credence to.5
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, role theory has proven productive in IR and for-
eign policy analysis, experiencing something of a revival in recent years. A full ex-
ploration of role theory exceeds the scope of this paper (see, among others, Malici
and Walker, 2017; Thies, 2010; Thies and Breuning, 2012), but the following con-
cepts have proven particularly insightful and are taken forward below as a way of
thinking about how roles structure social expectations and signal them to role-play-
ing individuals, here state leaders: 1) role-taking, the process by which leaders adopt
the perspective of important interlocutors to assess the range of behaviors they are
expected to engage in; 2) role-making, the active process of attempting to create,
through behavioral and linguistic cues, a particular social role; and finally 3) alter-cast-
ing, the attempt to induce certain behaviors from others that accord with one’s un-
derstandings of the respective roles being played in a social interaction.6
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In viewing great power as a role rather than a status, the key question becomes:
what are great powers expected to do within the current international order; what
does the role of a great power entail?
BEYONDBALANCING: GREAT POWERMANAGEMENT
When IR scholars have been posed the question of what great powers do in world
politics, they have overwhelmingly focused on the balance of power. However, re-
cent research has brought the primacy of power balancing into question. Scholars
have shown, for example, how states often balance threats (Walt, 1986) or risk (Tal-
iaferro, 2004), or fail to balance at all (Kaufman et al., 2008). More importantly, it also
seems clear that great powers do far more than balance power. They also act to up-
hold and shape the other ‘fundamental institutions’ of international order: interna-
tional law; diplomacy; war; and great power management (see especially Bull, 2012
[1977]). In other words, balancing power is only one of several activities that great
powers have, at times, engaged in.
We view great power management (GPM) as especially important for grasping
the EU’s actorness in contemporary international politics. GPM has been generally
neglected by IR theorists, especially when compared to the balance of power. It is
generally associated with the work of Hedley Bull, for whom the preservation of
order in the international system is the most important expectation constitutive of
the great power role. Bull (2012 [1977]: 201–218) outlines six core expectations
that, he believes, characterize how great powers carry out this function:
1) preservation of the general balance of power;
2) crisis avoidance;
3) war avoidance;
4) maintaining local preponderance;
5) establishing spheres of interest; and
6) engaging in great power concerts.
As Alexander Astrov, one of the few recent IR theorists to think seriously about
GPM and its implications for world politics, notes (2011b: 2), “theoretical attention
given to great power management is miniscule in comparison” to that paid to the
other institutions of international society.7 For Astrov (2011a), Bull’s “classical” con-
ception of great power management requires updating if it is to be suitable for
analysing contemporary global society. In his view, Bull’s account reflects a prac-
tice of great power intervention characteristic of nineteenth and early twentieth
century diplomacy, which is centered on Westphalian notions of sovereign-equal-
ity, the balance of power, and regional spheres of influence. Astrov demonstrates
the need to expand the meanings of GPM beyond Bull’s initial conceptualization
through an analysis of the Russian-Georgian War of 2008. The Russian-Georgian
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War highlights the inadequacy of traditional conceptualizations of GPM because
it ended in the abject failure of Russian, EU, and American attempts at regional or-
dering.
Specifically, based on the work of Michel Foucault, GPM as an institution of con-
temporary international society is seen by Astrov (2011a: 22) to have a dualistic
structure, which he labels anarchical sovereignty and anarchical governance. Along-
side the classical ordering principle of sovereignty, another mode has come to the
fore – a modern mode of governance centered on the ‘conduct of conduct:’ a mode
of power directed not to the use of direct coercion but the policing of citizens so as
to nurture self-governing individuals in ways productive for the state (see also
Burchill, Gordon and Miller, 1991).
Consequently, for Astrov (2011a: 15–16) GPM in contemporary world politics is
not limited to the classical variety captured by Bull, but also includes “a ‘police’ mode
of governing, whereby great powers ‘conduct the conduct’ of the rest of the inter-
national society, whose members, sovereign states, are posited by Westphalian
arrangements as free individuals capable of conducting their own affairs” (see also
Neumann and Sending, 2010). During the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008, there-
fore, two modes of police governance were in operation: a non-liberal mode em-
ployed by Russia and a liberal one employed by the EU and the United States. The
EU, in particular, attempted to deploy what is frequently described as its ‘soft’ power
to further “milieu” goals as opposed to the “possession” goals sought by Moscow,
in the terms of Arnold Wolfer’s famous formulation (Kobzova, Popescu and Wilson,
2011: 79).
Beyond this specific example, Astrov shows convincingly that GPM remains an in-
fluential practice in world politics but that its form has changed since Bull’s initial
formulation. Importantly, understanding great power as a social role in international
relations via an appreciation of GPM (as a mode of governance) moves us beyond
considerations of whether a global actor is or is not a great power, to considerations
of whether it is or is not doing great power management, and if so, how. In the fol-
lowing section, we assess the extent to which the EU is engaging in GPM, and
whether this is of a classical or governmental variety. Before doing so, however, we
address some important methodological considerations of role-based accounts of
state action in international politics.
How Do Roles Explain? GPM and the Performativity of
Roles
A further reason for the tendency in IR to conceptualize great power as a status
rather than a role is the difficulty associated with many social explanations of
action, like those based on roles. Roles do not fully determine or cause observed
action in the predominant understanding of causal inference in mainstream IR
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and political science (e.g. King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; for an extended dis-
cussion see McCourt, 2014: 46–53). It is possible, for example, for someone
playing the role of professor to let a student lead class on occasion and yet still
be the professor, while the role of professor nevertheless explains much of what
they do.
To critics, the idea that social roles explain action without determining it seems like
a circular argument, a neat description of observed actions rather than a real expla-
nation, or at best a constitutive explanation, but not a causal one (see Wendt, 1998).
A long-standing solution to the problem of how social and normative features of
world politics – norms, identities, roles, etc. – explain is to invoke the logic of ap-
propriateness (March and Olsen, 1989: 23). From this perspective, socialized actors
‘fit’ their behaviour to expectations, rather than acting on cost-benefit analyses alone.
The scholar’s task is thus to prove that an actor has internalized particular expecta-
tions. The logic of appropriateness, however, is in fact a problematic solution to the
question of how normative features of world politics impact foreign policy-making.
Not only does the logic of appropriateness move the analytical task into the un-
knowable sphere of individual consciousness, but it creates a false binary: either in-
dividuals – here state leaders – act for calculated strategic reasons (related to
consequences) or they act in socially appropriate ways. Rather than being either/or,
in practice, the two often go hand-in-hand.
If the logics of consequences and appropriateness are rejected as the proper basis
for normative explanations of social behaviour, how then do roles explain social ac-
tion? What is required to answer this question is a different way of understanding so-
cial action, one offered by certain, more radical, forms of constructivism. Such
approaches see roles as fundamentally discursive and performative in nature, and
therefore as based on neither consequentialist reasoning nor the search for appro-
priateness.
As David McCourt (2011a, 2012), among others, has shown, roles are sets of ex-
pectations about a state’s appropriate behaviour in a given situation, expectations
that are embedded in discourses, understood as both language and practices – a
state’s typical ways of doing things on the world stage (see also Bourbeau, 2017;
Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Pouliot, 2008). McCourt (2014) explores how British elites
and policy-makers have, since the end of the Second World War, been especially re-
ceptive to a discourse of great power-ness – of Britain as something more than a
medium-sized regional power with a stake in international order broadly understood.
Other important powers, in the British case especially France and the United States,
have at crucial times participated in making meaningful what McCourt (2014: 2)
calls Britain’s “residual great power” role. While this great power role discourse has
not had automatic effects – consider its limited impact during the 2016 Brexit vote
(see Glencross and McCourt, 2018) – it has significantly shaped British foreign pol-
8 NewPerspectives Vol. 27, No. 1/2019
DAVID M. McCOURT AND ANDREW GLENCROSS
icy-makers’ decision-making over the last seven decades, despite its ongoing rela-
tive decline.
To grasp how such roles are constructed, it is useful to first reject a common mis-
understanding of constructivist approaches in security studies. Luiza Bialasiewicz et
al. (2007) have shown how discursive versions of constructivism are often miscon-
strued as denying the importance of material factors in world politics, like economic
and military power. Constructivism is often mistakenly understood as an ideational
approach to world politics: constructivism, it is frequently implied, suggests that what
can be thought differently – e.g. Britain or the EU’s role or identity in world politics
– will become different. But such a view is actually a fundamental misreading of con-
structivism as an approach to IR (see Kratochwil, 2008). While constructivism fore-
grounds intersubjective meanings like roles, those meanings are not simply ‘ideas.’
Rather, they inhere in institutions, practices and rules, which are every bit as ‘real’ as
the supposed concrete interests foregrounded by materialists.
Bialasiewicz et al. follow the work of Foucault and Judith Butler in utilizing the
metaphor of performativity rather than construction to understand how institutions,
practices, rules and roles underpin behaviour. “Understanding discourse as involv-
ing both the ideal and the material, the linguistic and the non-linguistic,” they stress,
“means that discourses are performative” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 406). Under-
stood in this way as fundamentally discursive constructions, social roles – here the
role of great power – then can be seen to constitute international actors in world pol-
itics in particular ways.
For example, expectations that Britain will ‘punch above its weight’ in world pol-
itics take on greater significance in light of well-known concerns about it having ‘lost
an empire and not yet found a role’ (see McCourt, 2014 and 2011b). This means that
UK politicians are especially keen not to be seen as behaving as leaders of an ‘ordi-
nary’ power, but one with global interests. These role terminologies are not thereby
simply neutral descriptions of UK foreign policy. Rather, they are fundamentally part
of the performance of Britain-in-the-world.
Once again, the important conceptual move is to replace the question of what
states are – is the EU, or Britain, really a great or middle power? – with what states
do and are expected to do within specific discursive contexts. As Bialasiewicz et al.
go on (2007: 406, emphasis added), states do not use discourse; rather, “[s]tates
are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration
policies, military deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social
behavior, political speeches and economic investments.” From this perspective, once
again, the relevant issue in relation to the EU is not whether it is or is not a particu-
lar kind of actor – a great power – but whether its leaders and institutions are ex-
pected to behave in world politics in ways usefully captured by the analytical concept
of great power – as modified above.
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Roles thus convey expectations to policy-makers about appropriate action, and
in so doing they indicate plausible political strategies for leaders to pursue. Below
we use the role theoretic concepts of role-making and alter-casting – the adoption
of policies and language by Ego designed to cast Alter into a complementary role
– to frame our analysis of how great power role expectations are communicated in
the EU case. But a recent literature in IR theory on the importance of recognition
and mutual recognition in international relations is also instructive for understand-
ing the performative nature of social roles, and could prove useful in further stud-
ies.8 Scholars contributing to this literature have shown how states’ search for
recognition in international politics is every bit as much a basic drive of states as the
search for security. Just as individuals tell stories about themselves to make their
identities hang together, so too do states, and they – again like people – endeavor
to have those stories recognized as truthful and meaningful by others (Ringmar,
2012: 6).
European Union leaders too seek to not merely play but come to be recognized
as playing the role of a great power manager. What is at issue from a mutual recog-
nition perspective is once again not what the EU really is, but whether EU leaders feel
recognized and respected in the role they see themselves as expected to play. The
EU, in turn, is a participant in processes of mutual recognition with other states and
international actors around the world, from large actors like the US, Russia, and
China – which we detail below – to lesser states still desirous of recognition as sov-
ereign states, say countries in Africa and Central Asia.
Crucially, however, while performative in nature – constituting state action in a
thicker sense than the metaphor of construction allows – roles do not fully deter-
mine state action in world politics. Other strategies remain possible for policy-mak-
ers; other performances can be made. Furthermore, roles are counterfactually valid.
Consider, for example, the cross-cutting discourses of American foreign policy at
the present time: on the one hand, the US’s long-standing role of hegemon and
global leader; on the other, American exceptionalism or isolationism, as evidenced
by President Trump’s rhetoric of “America First.” The discourse of America’s hege-
mon role remains prominent, even as Trump behaves in ways quite counter to it in
response to imperatives from the discourse of America First. In the EU case, no in-
ternationalist discourse counter to the projection of power and influence described
in the EUGS 2016 would seem to be evident.
Not all role performances are successful; nor are other role performances pre-
cluded in our understanding, it should also be stressed. Role performances can mis-
fire, as – to take another British example – during the 1956 invasion of Egypt (see
McCourt, 2014: 58–85), when the United States in particular disagreed with British
leader Anthony Eden’s assessment of what the great power role required of Britain
should be following the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt. Built into role dis-
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courses are normative expectations about how a role should and should not be
played – and it does not follow that state leaders will always, or even typically, ad-
here to such normative cues.
Finally, it follows from role-based accounts of the actions of putative great pow-
ers that the analytical task facing the scholar is the interpretive one of grasping what
the discourse of great power suggests is appropriate and required for an actor play-
ing the role. Practically speaking, this means analysing public statements of the actor
in question, and viewing them not as masks for other – presumably material – in-
terests, but as performances of thick role-based expectations. The statements of
other actors that contribute to the discourse of great power role-playing – important
states as well as domestic audiences – are also an important part of the analysis. In
the following section, therefore, we draw on published primary and secondary ma-
terial to establish the plausibility of a great power role-based understanding of EU
foreign and security policy, one centred on the practice of great power manage-
ment.
THE EUROPEANUNIONAS AGREAT POWERMANAGER
How far is the EU expected to engage in great power management in contempo-
rary world politics? In this section we address first the role-making of EU leaders be-
fore switching to the expectations EU officials ‘take’ from key others to assess the
role the EU is being alter-cast into. In addition, we examine the alter-casting the EU
itself engages in, using insights from the logic of governmentality to show that con-
ducting the conduct of states in international politics is the milieu goal of the union
as a great power manager" or "to show that as a great power manager, the union
has conducting the conduct of states in international politics as its milieu goal. Sim-
ply put, we find that – against theoretical common-sense as well as conventional
wisdom – great power management practices are a crucial driver of the EU’s con-
temporary behaviour in international affairs.
Making the Great Power Role for Europe
Assertions by EU leaders of the necessity for Europe to play a large role on the in-
ternational stage are commonplace. Unless we are to assume such language signi-
fies a collective delusion in Brussels, it suggests EU policy makers perceive the EU
to be rightfully engaged in many of the behaviours that are characteristic of great
power managers in Bull’s classical formulation: crisis management and conflict pre-
vention, regional primacy, and the maintenance of the general balance and good re-
lations with other major powers.
The existence of a large role for the EU to play on the world stage was laid out
clearly in the 2003 European Security Strategy (EU, 2003), in which the EU is “in-
evitably a global player […] it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global
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security and in building a better world” (ESS, 2003: 1). For former European Coun-
cil President Herman Van Rompuy, “[i]t is [the EU’s] responsibility and our duty, vis-
ą-vis ourselves and our children, to continue to shape the world of tomorrow” (2011:
9). Former High Representative for CFSP Catherine Ashton noted in May 2012 that
“we will continue to do what the framers of the Lisbon Treaty – and long before
them, Robert Schuman – intended; for Europe to play an active role in solving global
problems” (2012: 2).
This mindset shows continuity across the EU foreign policy leadership changes.
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs succeeding Ashton, Federica Mogherini,
for example, told the UK think tank Chatham House, “the EU should be aware of its
potential. […] Sometimes I say the European Union is a superpower and some might
doubt this. But we are a superpower if we combine our tools” (Mogherini, 2015: 6).
What casts doubt on the plausibility of this assertion is the somewhat limited extent
of European integration in foreign policy as compared with economic matters, the
rise of non-European actors in world politics, and the internal cracks within the EU
that produced (e.g.) the Brexit vote in the UK.
Nonetheless, these expansive statements on the EU’s actorness rest on the claim
that the world is changing and that it is imperative that the EU shape the interna-
tional order in line with its own interests by assuming an appropriate role. As Van
Rompuy stated in late 2010, “In this new world, which may offer us many surprises,
we have to get and occupy our place” (2010: 9). For Ashton, “it is no longer ‘our’
world […] we need the EU not just for us in Europe, but also as the vehicle to act in
a fast-changing world and to influence its direction with our ideas” (Ashton, 2010:
3). Although the world is becoming “more and more a-polar, rather than bi-polar
or multi-polar as we once thought it would become,” Van Rompuy was, nonethe-
less, “convinced that Europe can play a role. It may sometimes not seem like it, but
as a united force, our Union is a growing entity on the world stage” (Van Rompuy,
2013b: 3).
Statements such as these saying that the EU should be playing a significant role in
the world are matched by frequently-made claims that the EU is already a big player,
which invoke its status as the world’s largest provider of development assistance, a
key actor in the WTO, the world’s major supporter of the International Criminal Court
and the global fight against climate change, and the inspiration behind the forma-
tion of the G-20. However, these assertions are also accompanied by self-awareness
of criticisms of the EU’s weakness. “I know the EU (or Europe) is sometimes derided
as somewhat of a ‘Florence Nightingale,’” Van Rompuy told an audience in London.
“But soft power is not a dirty word. And we don’t just send nurses and nutritionists,
we also send judges and policemen, we send soldiers and marines. We help build
statehood, security, the rule of law” (Van Rompuy, 2013c: 3). In his view, the EU might
not be a military power, but “military power is on the wane […] among the democ-
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racies with the biggest armies, we see […] that their public opinions or parliaments fur-
ther restrain the use of that force” (Van Rompuy, 2013a: 13).
The EU’s disadvantages in lacking control over armed forces are therefore down-
played since “economic might counts for more” (Van Rompuy, 2013a: 13). This logic
points to the method of great power management employed by the EU in terms of
policing the conduct of other states rather than the traditional goals associated with
a Bullian conception of managing international order. The EU’s process of alter-cast-
ing involves inducing behavior from key partners so as to nurture a self-governing
liberal order that the EU sees as strategically beneficial as well as normatively desir-
able. Indeed, a closer examination also reveals that this alter-casting even takes place
within the EU, whereby member states and EU institutions seek to induce more ac-
tive role-taking within international politics.
Is the EU Actually Doing Great Power Management (and
How)?
While indicative, these statements remain insufficient to support the claim that the
EU really can be thought of as a great power manager. The self-understandings of
EU policy-makers as playing the great power role have to be objectively meaning-
ful too. Put simply, is the EU actually doing GPM? In this section, we use Bull’s cat-
egories as a baseline for such an assessment, while also keeping in mind the dual
structure – sovereignty and governmentality – of contemporary GPM.
Crisis management and war limitation
The main evidence for the EU as a crisis manager is its active engagement in inter-
national crises stretching from Iran’s nuclear negotiations to Somali piracy, and to the
civil wars in Ukraine and Syria. Although the negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear am-
bitions only hit the headlines in 2009, they began ‘bilaterally’ between the EU, rep-
resented by the “EU-3” of the UK, France and Germany, and Iran in 2003 (Sauer,
2007: 613). After a chronicle of failure and prevarication, the talks then migrated to
the International Atomic Energy Agency, and eventually to the UN Security Coun-
cil in 2006. Since that time, the EU has been at the forefront of the negotiations that
resulted in July 2015’s Iran nuclear deal.
The Iran deal, which was subsequently plunged into disarray by the election of
Donald Trump (Kroenig, 2018), bore the hallmarks of governmentality. The agree-
ment came about following the coordination of sanctions to change Tehran’s be-
haviour, accompanied by a series of phased-in economic incentives to stick to the
arrangement. The EU’s attempts to maintain the deal in the wake of the American
withdrawal further showcases this policing logic. Instead of siding with Trump to re-
sort to coercion for further concessions, the EU’s response has been to seek to main-
tain the beneficial economic ties designed to induce Iran to limit its nuclear weapons
13NewPerspectives Vol. 27, No. 1/2019
THE EU'S SOCIAL ROLE AS A GREAT POWER MANAGER
programme. This ambition requires in turn the as-yet untested ability to limit extra-
territorial US sanctions on EU companies.
Further evidence of the EU’s engagement in GPM is provided by Europe’s in-
volvement in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. In response to the worsen-
ing situation, the UNSC invoked its chapter VII prerogatives to mandate an
anti-piracy mission, beginning in 2008. As part of this mission, the EU launched Op-
eration ATALANTA to protect shipping lanes around the Gulf of Aden as well as
World Food Program convoys (Riddervold, 2011). This deployment (some 2000 per-
sonnel) takes place alongside Combined Task Force 151, which is headed by the
US, NATO Operation Allied Protector and autonomous maritime deployments by
Russia and China. Consequently, the EU is a fully-fledged participant in the UN-led
management of threats to the peace, an endeavour traditionally delegated to great
powers.
The EU has been drawn into two major regional conflicts in the past decade: Syria
and Ukraine. While these crises have illustrated a number of limitations in the EU’s
international clout, they have also served to demonstrate the EU’s GPM approach.
That approach is based on accepting international responsibilities, as when the EU
enacted sanctions on the Syrian regime at the request of the US and the Arab
League of States and joined the Action Group for Syria alongside China, Russia and
the US (Turkmani, 2018). Equally, the GPM favoured by the EU entails attempts to
induce changes in the behaviour of state parties in these conflicts, from sanctioning
Russian companies and individuals linked to the annexation of Crimea, to providing
financial assistance for Turkey to control migrants crossing its border into the EU
(Lehner, 2018).
Regional order and spheres of influence
In relation to the creation and maintenance of regional orders and spheres of influ-
ence, it is clear that the EU has achieved something akin to the first objective at least.
The EU is, in essence, a regional ordering process that seeks to police the behaviour
of neighbouring states by locking in citizens within those countries to the principles
of an EU-led order. Its principal mechanisms are the list of conditions attached to ac-
cession (Grabbe, 2005) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Barbé and
Johansson-Nogués, 2008), which are deployed to induce change in government
policies and develop forms of supranational loyalty out of self-interest. Launched in
2004, the ENP (see European External Action Service, 2015) has the stated aim to
promote stability, security and prosperity in countries close to Europe, and includes
political association, trade agreements and financial incentives. The dangling of visa-
free travel for candidate and potential candidate countries, as well as neighbours
not seen as potential members, notably, is a way to create domestic pressure on
governments to provide reforms in line with EU expectations of good governance.
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Here the alter-casting process is structured around defining conduct that befits or
deviates from EU norms and seeking to nurture acceptance of those norms across
the populations of states whose principal economic and political relationship is with
Brussels.
The EU’s commitment to regional stabilization and crisis-management is demon-
strated in its post-conflict role in Georgia, where the EU leads the sole international
monitoring mission, the EUMM. The mission’s aim is “to ensure that there is no re-
turn to hostilities, to facilitate the resumption of a safe and normal life[,]…to build
confidence among the parties and to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider re-
gion” (EUMM, 2018). More consequentially, the EU has sought to gain control over
the process of stabilizing its most hazardous neighbouring region: the Balkans. A
stabilizing mission run by the EU took over responsibility for providing security in
Bosnia from NATO in 2004 (Menon, 2009). At the same time, by sponsoring direct
bilateral talks between Serbia and Kosovo, the EU has thus established a prepon-
derant role for itself in the maintenance of the regional order, which is no mean feat
given the divisions that made a decisive military response impossible in the early
1990s (see especially Rathbun, 2004).
Beyond accession and the ENP, the EU’s main ordering capacities lie within the
sphere of economics. Perhaps the most significant recent challenge to the regional
order within the EU – and hence to the claim that it is engaged in great power man-
agement – is the sovereign debt crisis (2010-) occasioned by the global financial
meltdown of 2008. From the start, economists had strong doubts about whether
the countries involved met the criteria for an optimum currency area, especially as
the Euro brought high-end exporting countries (notably Germany) together with
others whose economic performance was determined by domestic demand (pe-
ripheral countries such as Portugal and Greece) (see Mankiw, 2015). Yet when mem-
ber states using the Euro became frozen out of the capital markets, the EU undertook
unprecedented steps to shore up the single currency, while imposing unprecedented
controls on domestic sovereignty over budgetary affairs. From a GPM perspective,
this process is best understood as a form of alter-casting internal to the EU. Also
noteworthy here are the attempts of Germany and the Netherlands to make a role
for themselves within the EU as the guardians of fiscal discipline. In other words, for
the EU to function externally as a participant in GPM, it is imperative to control the
conduct of its member states, especially the fiscal policies of those that use the Euro
even though the outcome has been contested in a number of Eurozone countries
(see Glencross, 2014).
There is strong evidence, therefore, that Europe is engaged in great power man-
agement along two dimensions of the framework developed above: crisis and war
avoidance; and the maintenance of local preponderance and the creation of spheres
of influence. The final task is to assess the third component: the management of bi-
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lateral relations with other great powers – Russia, China and the US – and the main-
tenance of the general balance in the international system. This provides the op-
portunity to assess the extent to which these actors are communicating to EU leaders
the expectation that Europe should engage in GPM. In large measure, the leading
states are treating the EU as a fellow great power manager.
Alter-casting the EU into a Great Power Role: Bilateral
Relations and the General Balance
Russia
The EU first negotiated a formal bilateral mechanism of cooperation with Russia in
1994, which came into force in 1997 (Timmermann, 1996). This Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement (PCA) committed member states to pursue common eco-
nomic and political objectives with Russia through the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). Between 1999 and 2004, the EU pursued a unilateral ‘Com-
mon Strategy for Russia’ under the legal framework of the CFSP made possible by
the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) (Forsberg, 2004). This strategy was supposed to com-
mit EU member states to coordinate their foreign policies towards Russia with the
aim of consolidating democracy, market reforms and the rule of law in the latter.
Since 2005 both sides have been seeking a replacement for the 1997 PCA, with no
final agreement as yet although formal political dialogue between them is frequent:
there are biannual summits, Russian Government-European Commission meetings,
a Permanent Partnership Council involving ministerial-level representation, and an
inter-parliamentary Cooperation Committee.
There is, therefore, evidence that Russia begrudgingly accepts the EU’s role as a
manager of international politics, with trade and energy particularly salient issue-areas
in their relations. Russia has thus taken a keen interest in developments in European
integration since the end of the Cold War, pursuing an active engagement with a
view to managing the international order. In the aftermath of the NATO intervention
in Kosovo, Russia actively courted security cooperation through the nascent ESDP,
which was rightly interpreted as benign towards its interests (Forsberg, 2004). Ini-
tially, Russia hoped that the ESDP would reduce NATO’s influence on the continent,
although this perception soon waned in light of EU countries’ unwillingness to break
with America (Rontoyanni, 2002). Nevertheless, in the 2000s, Russia continued to
seek to institutionalize the cooperation within ESDP decision-making, notably through
the call for the creation of an analogue to the NATO-Russia Council.
This is not to say that cooperation has at all times been the name of the game. On
matters such as energy policy or relations with former Soviet satellites, Russia has
played the divide and rule card by privileging bilateral relations with individual EU
countries. (Rontoyanni, 2002) This approach is evident in Russia’s 2009 withdrawal
from the Energy Charter Treaty, which served to lessen its formal cooperation with
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the EU on energy (Leonard and Popescu, 2007). Moreover, Russia has attempted to
scupper the EU-financed Nabucco gas pipeline through the development of a rival
Gazprom initiative (South Stream). However, all of this suggests that Russia – again,
begrudgingly – takes seriously the EU’s role as a great power manager.9
The United States
Of the existing major powers, the US has been the most ambivalent towards en-
gaging with the EU as a great power manager. Rhetorically, the American ambiva-
lence was most obvious in the prelude to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld sought to divide “Old and New Europe.” It was also on display
during the creation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ specifically for the Iraq invasion, a
device that allowed the US administration to bypass the EU in favour of bilateral re-
lations with individual nation-states. But while on the face of it surprising, the US
ambivalence becomes more understandable when viewed in role terms as a related
to conflict between the hegemon and the potential actions of a great power firmly
within its hegemonic orbit. Put simply, not only must US leaders balance relations
with Brussels against important relations with European capitals, but America must
also police the boundaries of European action independent of itself, the hegemon.
Once again, in so doing, Washington provides evidence that the EU is increasingly
engaging in great power management.
Most concretely, during the run-up to the Lisbon Treaty, the US administration
manoeuvred to ensure that the nascent EU Constitutional Treaty did not encroach
upon NATO competences. In this way, the US clearly articulated a policy of de-
fending its interest in preserving regional leadership in Europe within the framework
of the Atlantic Alliance. Since 1998, the US has explicitly articulated three redlines
that must not be breached in the context of EU-NATO relations: no decoupling from
NATO, no duplication of NATO command structures or alliance-wide resources, and
no discrimination against NATO members that are not EU members (Archick and
Gallis, 2005). The 2003 proposal by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg to
create a European military headquarters in Belgium was interpreted in Washington
as a breach of these redlines. This led the US to lobby hard for the insertion into the
EU Constitutional Treaty of a formal recognition of “compatibility” between the EU
security and defence cooperation and NATO (Article I-41.2; see Cimbalo, 2004).
Nevertheless, the transatlantic divergence over Iraq did not preclude the US from
seeking to engage with the EU over a variety of crucial security issues: counter-ter-
rorism measures as well as both Iraqi and Afghan stabilization. On the former, the
US sought out a cooperation with the EU to devise common measures on sharing
airline passenger data, screening cargo, and the extradition of terrorist suspects. On
the question of stabilizing post-conflict Iraq and Afghanistan, the US sought to co-
operate with the EU, resulting in the disbursement of economic assistance through
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the auspices of the European Commission. Significant monies were pledged during
the 2002 Tokyo Conference, the 2004 Berlin Conference, and the 2006 London
Conference, taking EU development assistance to 8 billion euros (including mem-
ber state contributions) for the period 2002–2010.
China
EU-China summitry is often dismissed as inconsequential (see Bailes and Wetter,
2007). Since it is a latecomer to international security cooperation, it is perhaps not
surprising that China’s bilateral desire to engage on security matters with the distant
EU should be somewhat limited. China is the state with the most realistic claim to
being a great power in the current international system. But it is also the one with
the least historically and institutionally sedimented relationship with Europe. Despite
this, the two actors’ bilateral relations have grown significantly since the signing of
the Lisbon Treaty. In the wake of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis the Chinese
government has stressed its preference for a strong Euro as an alternative reserve
currency to the dollar, leading to its purchases of national debt across the Eurozone.
In terms of security cooperation, the bilateral coordination pushed by China is very
limited. A 2004 summit produced an EU-Chinese Joint Declaration on Non-Prolif-
eration and Arms Control, which has resulted in regular consultations at expert level.
Great Power Concerts
The final aspect of GPM relates to the extent of European participation in great
power concerts. Here the question of Europe’s identity and its recognition as a great
power manager emerges sharply: is the EU more akin to a state, or an international
organization? On the one hand, the EU represents a complex concert of the former
European great powers. On the other, since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, the EU has
been given the ability to participate in discussions with formal and informal groups,
most notably the G7/8/20 and the UN Security Council. Again, the question of
whether the EU can be a great power here can be put to one side in favour of as-
sessing whether Europe is being accepted, or recognized, as a great power man-
ager in international affairs.
Not surprisingly, the EU’s engagement with great power concerts is strongest in
the economic sphere. The EU is now an accepted participant in the meetings of the
G7/8 and the G20. Formally the G7 comprises the US, Britain, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy and Japan. However, the EU is a de facto eighth member, having partic-
ipated in it since 1981 as a so-called ‘nonenumerated’ member, and today
participating fully in the meetings of finance ministers that take place during the G7
summits. The EU is more formally a member of the currently defunct G8 (the G7 plus
Russia) and, more consequentially, the G20, which has assumed prominence in
global economic and financial cooperation since the Financial Crisis of 2008.
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Of more interest is the EU’s growing representation at the foremost concert of
existing great powers: the United Nations. What is significant is that although in
the UN, the EU has an observer status only – which puts it on a par with entities
such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Common Fund
for Commodities – the EU has gradually gained capacities reserved for states; an
Assembly resolution of May 2011, for example, allows the EU to present common
positions (see European Union, 2011). Crucially, the Security Council itself has re-
peatedly sought to work with the EU despite the fact that there is a very limited
legal basis for formal EU representation within the UN. Thus, although the EU’s
presence in these great power forums remains unique alongside the more long-
standing powers, Europe is increasingly accepted as a partner at the top table of
great power politics.
CONCLUSION: GREAT POWER IS (EXPECTED) AS GREAT
POWERDOES
In this paper we have revisited the concept of great power via an analysis of the EU’s
expanding capabilities in international security and diplomacy, arguing that much
can be gained from explicitly conceptualizing great power as a social role rather
than a status. Without rejecting the importance of status-seeking, we have shown
how, understood as a role, great power expectations go a long way toward ex-
plaining the EU’s curious ‘actorness,’ despite its non-state nature and developments
like Brexit.10 Linking this reconceptualization to the notion of great power manage-
ment, notably the recent reconsiderations of that concept by Astrov (2011a), we
have argued that much is gained for our understanding of contemporary interna-
tional order and the actions of other great powers and potential great powers
through this reconceptualization.
Europe’s institutional mechanisms and policy ambitions for playing a significant role
in international security and diplomacy are matched by the willingness of non-Euro-
pean UN Security Council permanent members to co-opt the EU into the manage-
ment of international affairs. The EU, we have shown, is both doing great power
management and is increasingly expected to do so. Our focus on what the EU is being
expected to do is crucial, however. Those critical of viewing the EU in great power
terms might respond to our argument by protesting its divided nature. The EU-3 and
the former great powers of France, Germany, and, until Brexit happens, Britain remain
more significant power bases in Europe. They might also point to failures and ineffi-
ciencies in EU diplomacy and foreign policy as evidence that the EU cannot really be
a great power. Yet, we have attempted to remain consistently analytical – rather than
normative – about our deployment of the concepts of great power and great power
management. We make no claims about the quality of the EU’s foreign policy; we only
point out that EU leaders feel and consistently express – for better or worse – that the
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Union has a rightful place in the management of important issues and crises in world
politics.
It follows from this paper, therefore, that future research on EU foreign and secu-
rity policy should not begin from and end at the issue of Europe’s capacity and in-
tentions, but should pay significant attention to the expectations being
communicated to EU leaders, and whether they continue or shift the tendencies ex-
plored here. What do other great power managers, like China and the hegemon the
United States, want from the EU? What do other actors in the international system,
like citizens, global NGOs and corporations, expect from the EU? It is they who will
shape the contexts in which the EU acts internationally.
To conclude with only one line of investigation, following Astrov’s fruitful recon-
ceptualization of Hedley Bull’s original English School formulation of GPM – away
from a classical understanding of GPM toward management based on the con-
ducting of the conduct of ‘lesser’ states and other global actors – the paper has high-
lighted an important tension in EU foreign and security policy that is worthy of
consideration. As a body composed of liberal democratic states and constructed
along liberal lines, the EU is expected to conduct itself on the global stage in a lib-
eral manner – seeking ‘milieu goals’ and changes in the nature of governance in
lesser actors rather than the blunt use of hard military and economic power. The
question arises, however, of whether the EU will be able to maintain such a liberal
form of governance in an international order increasingly populated by illiberal pow-
ers such as Russia and China. Is French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call for
a “real, true European army” (BBC, 2019) an early signal of a change in viewpoint
among European elites, according to which the time has come to equip Europe –
whether within the EU or without – with the capacity to conduct illiberal police ac-
tions in furtherance of GPM or GPM as more classically understood by Bull?
ENDNOTES
1 Alongside Astrov (2011), a few recent works are noteworthy in what seems like a nascent revival of the
concept. See in particular the work of Benjamin Zala (2017). See also Cui and Buzan (2016), Goh (2016),
Quayle (2018), Little (2006), Kopra (forthcoming, 2019), and Wehner (2017).
2 Crucially, for example, the United States – particularly since the end of the Cold War, but likely well be-
fore that – has not played the role of a great power in world politics, but one more accurately concep-
tualized as a hegemon role – the principal difference being the primarily regional nature of the influence
of great powers and the global character of hegemons. The hegemon role thus clashes in important
ways with the great power role, and especially the attempts of others – notably Russia and China – to
play the great power role in a non-liberal mode, or, in the latter case, to potentially adopt the global role
of a hegemon.
3 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to make this point clearly, and from
whom we have borrowed some language directly.
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4 See also Bull’s (1980) scathing assessment of the job America and the Soviet Union had done of man-
aging international society in their era of stewardship.
5 See Goddard and Nexon (2005) for a discussion of how, while defining great power as a status, Waltz
ends up importing a vision of states as playing the role of enemy to every other state from the systems
theory of sociologist Talcott Parsons. This provides further evidence that great power cannot, in fact, be
understood as principally or solely a status.
6 These concepts do not exhaust the theoretical lexicon of role-theory and are thereby not the only role-
associated concepts that could shed light on great power role-playing in international politics. In par-
ticular, as discussed further below, the notion of mutual recognition seems to represent a fruitful
alternative to the concept of alter-casting for exploring how states are mutually constituted through
role-based interaction (see especially Lindemann and Ringmar, 2012).
7 This relative neglect of GPM is surprising, however, given the fact that Waltz himself devoted an entire
chapter (Chapter 9) of Theory of International Politics to the subject. There Waltz makes clear that as the
big winners in international politics, great powers have a particularly large stake in the stability of the
system. “[G]reat power,” he claims (1979: 195), “gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the
ability to act for its sake. For them management becomes both worthwhile and possible.”
8 See Lindemann and Ringmar (2012) for a good overview. Also see Lindemann (2010); Murray (2018);
and the symposium in International Theory, 5(1) (2013): 94–176.
9 One might also consider Russian trolling and online disruption as forms of great power management;
see Kurowska and Reshetnikov (2018).
10 See especially Bretherton and Vogler (2006). For a thorough and insightful review of the concept’s his-
tory, see Drieskens (2016).
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